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ANOTHER LOOK AT THE EUROBAROMETER SURVEYS
WILLIAM H. J. HUBBARD*
The current proposal for a Common European Sales Law (CESL) makes a
number of empirical claims in support of its argument that differences in
contract law among Member States are stifling trade, and that CESL will
address these barriers to cross-border trade. These empirical claims rest
largely on citations to a number of Flash Eurobarometer surveys and other
surveys of businesses and consumers. A closer look at these surveys reveals
that the cited statistics do not support the claims that contract-law-related
obstacles present special barriers to cross-border trade for small- and mediumsized enterprises and consumers. Instead, a more ambiguous picture emerges –
one that may cast doubt on several of the design features of CESL. I conclude
that a more careful assessment of the empirical foundations for CESL
(whether in its current or a revised form) is necessary.

1.

Introduction

Last year, the European Commission published its Proposal for a
Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on a
Common European Sales Law (“Proposal”).1 The Proposal is the
product of extensive study and the latest manifestation of the
momentum in many quarters toward harmonization of European
contract law. The proposed Common European Sales Law (CESL) has
engendered a spirited debate about its costs and benefits.2 Notable
features of CESL include: its optional character as an opt-in regime of
sales law applicable to cross-border contracts; its applicability only to
business-to-business (B2B) contracts involving small- or medium-sized
enterprises (SMEs) and business-to-consumer (B2C) contracts; its
reliance on custom and usage in the B2B context; and its extensive,
mandatory consumer protection provisions in the B2C context. As
evidenced by the other papers in this volume, abler contracts scholars
than myself have offered both criticism and defense of these features.
Assistant Professor of Law, The University of Chicago Law School. I thank
Lisa Bernstein for drawing my attention to the Eurobarometer surveys, and
Nicole Cherry, Andrew Spruiell, and Shuang Tian Yang for valuable research
assistance.
1 COM 635(2011) final.
2 The papers presented at European Contract Law: A Law-and-Economics
Perspective and collected in this volume provide a small sampling of this
debate.
*
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Given this heated debate, one is tempted to ask if CESL is worth
the considerable effort and controversy attending it. To this question
the Proposal offers a clear answer. The Proposal opens with these
words:
Differences in contract law between Member States hinder traders
and consumers who want to engage in cross-border trade within
the internal market. The obstacles which stem from these
differences dissuade traders, small and medium-sized enterprises
(SME) in particular, from entering cross border trade or expanding
to new Member States’ markets. Consumers are hindered from
accessing products offered by traders in other Member States.3
In other words, whatever the strengths or weaknesses of its particular
details, CESL or something like it is needed. Current disuniformity in
contract law across Europe is stifling trade, especially by SMEs.
This is an empirical claim. More precisely, the Proposal’s language
quoted above contains a bundle of four empirical claims:
Claim 1: There are a significant number of traders in the EU, and
in particular SMEs, who want engage in cross-border trade or
increase their cross-border trade, but do not.
Claim 2: Obstacles created by differences in contract law are an
impediment to cross-border trade, especially for SMEs.
Claim 3: There are a significant number of consumers in the EU
who want to make cross-border purchases, but cannot.
Claim 4: Obstacles created by differences in contract law are an
impediment to cross-border purchases by consumers.
These empirical claims are the central justification for CESL.4 With
respect to SMEs, if the first claim is not true, then there is no problem
to solve; and if the second claim is not true, then CESL will not solve
the problem. Likewise, for consumers, if the third claim is not true,
then there is no problem to solve; and if the fourth claim is not true,
then CESL will not solve the problem.

Proposal, 2.
There are other important justifications as well, such as fostering a common
European legal identity and establishing shared values throughout Europe.
See, Mak, “In Defense of CESL,” this volume.
3
4

3
The Proposal does not make these claims without offering evidence
to support them. The European Commission sponsored studies to
address aspects of these claims, and the Proposal expressly cites this
empirical data. In particular, the Proposal cites two surveys, Flash
Eurobarometer 320 and 321, to point out that “traders ranked
contract-law-related obstacles among the top barriers to cross-border
trade.”5 (Flash EB 320 surveyed enterprises engaged in B2B
transactions, and Flash 321 surveyed enterprises engaged in B2C
transactions.) This suggests that contract law is a major impediment
to cross-border trade, and it raises the possibility that a large number
of traders are dissuaded from cross-border trade.
The Proposal’s companion document, A Common European Sales
Law to Facilitate Cross-Border Transactions in the Single Market
(“Companion Document”),6 cites Flash Eurobarometer 299 as evidence
of the small number of European consumers currently purchasing
online from other countries.7 The Companion Document also cites the
Third Edition of the Consumer Markets Scoreboard (“Scoreboard”),8 for
the claim that “attempts to purchase products online more often fail
than succeed in a cross-border context.”9 This suggests that contract
law may be a major obstacle to cross-border activity by consumers as
well.

Proposal, 2. Flash Eurobarometer 320, “European contract law in businessto-business transactions” (Flash EB 320) was a survey conducted by the
Gallup Organization in January 2011 of 6,475 managers at enterprises in the
27 EU member states. See Summary, Flash EB 320 (2011) and Analytical
Report, Flash EB 320 (2011). Flash Eurobarometer 321, “European contract
law in consumer transactions” (Flash EB 321) was a survey conducted by the
Gallup Organization in January 2011 of 6,465 managers at enterprises in the
27 EU member states. See Summary, Flash EB 320 (2011) and Analytical
Report, Flash EB 320 (2011). All Summaries and Analytical Reports for the
cited
Flash
EB
surveys
are
available
at
<ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/flash_arch_en.htm> (last visited 12
Sept. 2012).
6 COM 636(2011) final.
7 Companion Document, 3. Flash Eurobarometer 299, “Consumer attitudes
towards cross-border trade and consumer protection” (Flash EB 299), was a
survey conducted by the Gallup Organization in September 2010 of 25,139
individuals in the 27 EU member states. See Summary, Flash EB 299 (March
2011). Components of this survey were reported as Flash Eurobarometer
299a, “Attitudes towards cross-border trade and consumer protection” (Flash
EB 299a). See Analytical Report, Flash EB 229a (2011).
8 SEC 385(2010), 9.
9 Companion Document, 3.
5
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Given that this survey data provides the empirical foundation for
the perceived need that motivates CESL, these studies deserve a
closer look. In this paper, I undertake to do this.10 This paper assesses
the degree to which the Flash EB surveys support the four central
empirical claims in the Proposal. Section 2 focuses on claims about
SMEs (claims 1 and 2). Section 3 focuses on claims about consumers
(claims 3 and 4).
What I find is that the Flash EB and other surveys cited by the
Proposal offer an ambiguous picture of the extent to which contract
law may create obstacles to cross-border trade by businesses and
consumers. These surveys do not suggest that there are large numbers
of discouraged traders, or that contract law is in practice a major
obstacle to cross-border trade. They are consistent, however, with the
proposition that a small, but economically significant, number of
traders and consumers are discouraged from cross-border trade by
differences in European contract law. To prove this latter proposition
will require further, and more careful, study.
2.

Empirical Evidence on Cross-Border Trade, Contract
Law, and SMEs

Claim 1 is that there are a significant number of traders, in particular
SMEs, who want to (but do not) engage in cross-border trade or
increase the number of Member States with which they trade. The
Proposal itself provides a brief statement of the empirical basis for
this fundamental claim: “Currently, only one in ten [EU] traders,
involved in the sale of goods, exports within the Union and the
majority of those who do only export to a small number of member
states.”11 This statement can be broken down into two separate,
component claims:

The survey micro-data, or “primary data,” for these surveys is publicly
available through GESIS, <www.gesis.org> (last visited 12 Sept. 2012). All
data from the Flash EB 320 and 321 surveys presented in this paper are
based on this primary data; there may be slight discrepancies between the
summary statistics generated by this data and those presented in the
corresponding Analytical Reports or Summaries for the surveys. I rely solely
on the Summaries and Analytical Reports for the Flash EB 299 and Flash EB
299a surveys.
11 Proposal, 2.
10
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(1) “currently, only one in 10 [EU] traders, involved in the sale of
goods, exports within the Union.”12
(2) “the majority of those who do only export to a small number of
member states.”
These two statements together capture the two crucial aspects in
which barriers to trade, including contract-law-related barriers, may
hinder cross-border trade. The first statement refers to the extensive
margin. By “extensive margin,” I mean the extent to which new
businesses may be willing to enter cross-border trade if barriers to
trade are lowered. The second statement refers to the intensive
margin. By “intensive margin,” I mean how intensively companies
already engaged in cross-border trade can participate in trade with
other countries; i.e., businesses already engaged in cross-border trade
may be willing to trade with a greater number of Member States if
barriers to trade fall.
I look at each margin in turn.
2.1

The extensive margin

The fact that only one in ten EU traders involved in the sale of goods
exports within the EU suggests that there is a lot of room for
increasing participation in cross-border trade. From this, one might
conclude that the extensive margin is very large.
This conclusion, however, would be too hasty. The fact that 90
percent of traders do not export to other EU member states does not
mean that 90 percent of traders would export other EU member states
if the barriers to trade were lower. Some traders may have no interest
in exporting and many traders are involved in the sale of goods for
which there is essentially no international market – i.e., the market
for such goods is entirely local. Recall that a neighborhood bakery or
butcher shop is a “trader involved in the sale of goods.”
Instead, one should look for evidence on the number of companies
who are not trading cross-border but want to. The Flash EB surveys
cited by the Proposal are helpful here. These surveys asked each
respondent whether they were (1) currently buying or selling crossborder, (2) not currently buying or selling cross-border, but
The Proposal provides no citation for this figure, but it may come from
Flash Eurobarometer 196, “Observatory of European SMEs” (Flash EB 196),
which was a survey conducted by the Gallup Organization in NovemberDecember 2006 of 16,339 SMEs in the 27 EU member states. See Summary,
Flash EB 196 (2007).
12

6

William H. J. Hubbard

considering doing so, or (3) not interested in selling or buying crossborder. The third group was excluded from the sample, so the sample
included only businesses that were interested in cross-border trade.
Thus, the Flash EB 320 and 321 surveys allow us to see how large is
the group of traders who are interested but not engaged in crossborder trade relative to the group of traders already engaged in crossborder trade.
The results of the two surveys were essentially identical: more
than 91 percent of enterprises were currently buying or selling crossborder.13 We can now reconsider the earlier statistic that only one in
10 traders involved in the sale of goods exports within the EU. This
does not mean that 9 in 10 traders would export cross-border if the
barriers to trade were lower. Instead, the number is probably much
smaller. If 91 percent of the traders who want to trade are already
trading, this implies that the extensive margin is less than 1 in 100
traders.14
A caveat is in order here: this number is a rough cut of the Flash
EB data and is not at all a precise estimate of the extensive margin.15
Rather, the point is that the Proposal rests on an empirical claim that
there is a significant number of businesses out there, especially SMEs,
that want to trade cross-border but do not because of barriers to trade.
The Flash EB surveys cited by the Proposal indicate that the number
of such traders are relatively small.

The shares already engaged in cross-border trade was 91.6 percent (B2B)
and 91.5 percent (B2C).
14 If 1 out of 10 traders, or 10 percent of traders, are currently exporting, and
traders currently exporting are 91.5 percent of traders interested in
exporting, then traders interested in exporting make up 0.10/0.915 = 0.109 =
10.9 percent of all traders. Traders interested in exporting but not already
doing so make up 10.9 – 10.0 = 0.9 percent of all traders.
15 One limitation of this estimate is that the Flash EB surveys asked traders
about buying or selling cross-border, while the statistic cited by the Proposal
referred only to traders exporting. Thus, these two sets of numbers are not,
strictly speaking, comparable. Note, though, that in the B2C context, crossborder transactions with consumers are by definition exports only; and the
B2C numbers were virtually identical to the B2B numbers.
13
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TABLE 1: NUMBER OF ENTERPRISES, BY SIZE, FLASH EB SURVEYS

B2B

B2C

Number

Percent

Number

Percent

Micro (1-9)

4,077

63.0

3,678

56.9

Small (10-49)

1,684

26.0

1,882

29.1

Medium (50-249)

553

8.5

695

10.8

Large (250+)

161

2.5

210

3.2

6,475

100.0

6,465

100.0

All Respondents

Note: Parentheses contain number of employees in enterprises of each
category. Source: Flash EB 320 (B2B); Flash EB 321 (B2C).

Why might it make sense that the extensive margin would be
small? Many SMEs, especially small and micro enterprises, are
engaged in inherently local trade. While many SMEs may aspire to
trade cross-border, it is likely that many more do not. And since the
vast majority of all enterprises are small and micro enterprises (see
Table 1), one might expect the extensive margin to be small: the few
large companies are already trading cross-border, while a large
fraction of the many small companies are not interested in it. Indeed,
a strong predictor of SME participation in cross-border trade is the
size of its home country (SMEs in small countries trade more),16 which
suggest that geographical, rather than legal, barriers are the primary
determinants of cross-border trade.

16

Flash EB 196, 5, 16.
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TABLE 2: PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL EMPLOYMENT, BY ENTERPRISE SIZE,
FLASH EB SURVEYS
B2B

B2C

Micro (1-9)

4.1

4.2

Small (10-49)

9.2

10.6

Medium (50-249)

15.1

17.8

Large (250+)

71.6

67.4

100.0

100.0

All Respondents

Source: Flash EB 320 (B2B); Flash EB 321 (B2C).

The extensive margin looks even smaller when one considers not
the number of companies on the extensive margin, but the share of
employment on the extensive margin. Although small and micro
enterprises account for nearly 90 percent of the companies in the
sample, they account for only a little more than 10 percent of total
employment.17 See Table 2. Because small and micro enterprises
account for a small share of total employment, even a large rise in
their participation in cross-border trade will have a modest effect on
the volume of trade.
2.2

The intensive margin

The Proposal observes that “the majority of [traders] who do [export]
only export to a small number of Member States.” This claim is
validated by the Flash EB survey results, which indicate that among
enterprises that trade cross-border, approximately 60 percent trade

These shares are calculated after removing the two largest employers from
each of the Flash EB 320 and 321 samples. Out of over 6,000 enterprises, the
two largest in each survey accounted for approximately half of all
employment. Including these enterprises skews the numbers even more
strongly in favor of large companies. I use the truncated sample in the
remainder of this paper; for the remaining results, truncation has no effect.
17
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with three other countries or fewer.18 This suggests that, while the
extensive margin may be small, there may be room on the intensive
margin for policies to increase participation in cross-border trade.
FIGURE 1: PERCENTAGE OF ENTERPRISES ENGAGED IN CROSS-BORDER
TRADE WITH 4 OR MORE MEMBER STATES, BY ENTERPRISE SIZE, B2C
100
80
60
40
20
0
Micro (1-9)

Small (10-49)

Medium
(50-249)

Large (250+)

Note: Excludes traders not engaged in cross-border trade.
Source: Flash EB 321.

Once again, though, this statistic should be taken with care. A
closer look at the data reveals that intensity of cross-border trade is
strongly correlated with firm size. See Figure 1.19 Only among micro
and small enterprises do the majority of enterprises trade with three
or fewer other countries. Even among small enterprises nearly half of
them are already trading with four or more other countries.
This pattern in the data is consistent with two stories: First, as
noted above, it may simply be that the bulk of micro enterprises are
not in a position to trade more broadly, even if contract-law-related
barriers (or any other barriers) are reduced. If so, the intensive
margin is small. Second, it may be that contract-law-related barriers
to trade are greatest for micro enterprises, and this is why they
18
19

The shares are 59.9 percent (B2B) and 60.5 percent (B2C).
Figure 1 provides B2C data; B2B data yields the same pattern.
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disproportionately fail to engage in cross-border trade. In this case,
the intensive margin may be large. The Proposal accepts this view,
saying that “dealings with various national laws are burdensome
particularly for SME,”20 and the Companion Document goes on to note
that the burden falls especially on “micro and small enterprises.”21
If this latter account is true, then we should see evidence that
micro enterprises are more concerned than large enterprises about the
problems presented by contract law. If, however, the less intense
cross-border trade by SMEs is because SMEs are less interested in
cross-border trade than large companies, we should expect them to be
less concerned than large companies about contract-law-related
barriers to trade.
This brings us to Claim 2: that contract-law-related barriers to
trade are an impediment to trade by SMEs in particular. As I describe
below, SMEs are less concerned about contract-law-related barriers
than large enterprises.
2.3

Contract-Law-Related Barriers to Trade, Particularly for SMEs

Before comparing the attitudes of SMEs and large enterprises about
contract-law-related barriers, we must first review the evidence on
contract-law-related barriers cited by the Proposal. The Proposal
states:
“Surveys [citing Flash EB 320 and 321] show that out of the range
of obstacles to cross-border trade including tax regulations,
administrative requirements, difficulties in delivery, language and
culture, traders ranked contract-law-related obstacles among the
top barriers to cross-border trade.”22
This is true. The Flash EB surveys identify four contract-related
barriers, each of which easily falls in the top ten potential barriers to
trade listed in the Flash EB surveys. But given the structure of the
Flash EB surveys, this is an uninteresting result – the top ten
potential barriers to trade were the only ten potential barriers to trade
that the Flash EB survey described in its questionnaire.

Proposal, 3.
COM 636(2011) final, 2.
22 Proposal, 2.
20
21
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TABLE 3: PERCENTAGE OF ENTERPRISES IDENTIFYING A POTENTIAL
BARRIER AS HAVING A LARGE OR SOME IMPACT, B2C SURVEY
Potential Barrier to
Cross-Border Trade

“Large” or
“Some” Impact

Tax regulations

24

Learning about foreign contract law

23

Administrative requirements, e.g., licensing

21

Compliance with foreign consumer protection rules

20

Conflict resolution/cost of litigation abroad

19

Obtaining legal advice on foreign contract law

19

Language

18

After-sales maintenance abroad

16

Cross-border delivery

15

Cultural Differences

11

Source: Flash EB 321.

Nonetheless, the contract-law-related barriers included in the
Flash EB surveys were rated as about as significant as the other
potential barriers, such as tax regulations and problems with crossborder delivery. Table 3 lists all ten potential barriers and the
percentage of respondents identifying them as having “a large effect”
or “some effect” on the company’s decision to buy or sell cross-border.
The four contract-law-related barriers are placed in italics.23 They are
not all at the top, but they are not all at the bottom either. While the
Proposal overstates the import of the Flash EB surveys, the empirical
data do not foreclose the significance of contract law to cross-border
trade.

The list for the B2B survey is similar, although “Difficulty in agreeing on
the foreign applicable law” replaces “The need to comply with different
consumer protection rules in the foreign contract laws” – and ranks much
lower. See Summary, Flash EB 320, 7.
23
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TABLE 4: CONTRACT LAW IN CROSS-BORDER SALES, B2C SURVEY

Unimportant
Barrier

Small Barrier

Medium or
Great Barrier

Micro (1-9)

47.7

16.8

35.5

Small (10-49)

42.1

18.8

39.2

Medium (50-249)

40.7

19.1

40.1

Large (250+)

38.9

18.3

42.8

All Respondents

45.0

17.7

37.3

Note: Percentages may not add to 100 because of rounding.
Source: Flash EB 321.

But what about SMEs, and small and micro enterprises in
particular? How are they affected by contract law, relative to larger
companies? The data from the Flash EB surveys indicate that SMEs
are less concerned about contract-law-related barriers to trade than
large companies. Table 4 reveals that micro enterprises are less likely
to consider contract law to be a “medium” or “great” barrier to crossborder trade, and more likely to consider it an “unimportant” barrier,
than large enterprises.24 This evidence rejects the view that the low
intensity of cross-border trade by SMEs is the product of contract-lawrelated barriers. Indeed, a survey not cited by the Proposal finds that
46 percent of exporting SMEs did identify any constraint on their
cross-border trade, and only 8 percent identified a contract-law-related
obstacle (“different regulations in other EU countries”) as their main
constraint.25
In sum, a closer look at the Flash EB data tends to undermine the
hypothesis that there are large extensive and intensive margins along
which policies can increase participation in cross-border trade by
24
25

The B2B survey, Flash EB 320, yields the same pattern.
Summary, Flash EB 196, 16.
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SMEs. Further, while contract law is recognized by many traders as
an obstacle to trade, contract-law-related barriers do not distinguish
themselves from a number of other obstacles to trade considered in the
Flash EB surveys.
Nonetheless, small extensive and intensive margins are different
from no margins at all. Even a small increase in intra-EU trade would
involve a huge amount of commerce. Intra-EU export trade easily
exceeds €2 trillion (i.e., million million) per year.26 A 0.1 percent
increase in trade, for example, would amount to thousands of millions
of Euros.
Thus, reducing the obstacles to trade created by contract law
remains an project worth serious consideration, although we need to
be realistic about the extent of its potential impact. This bring us to
the ultimate question about CESL and cross-border trade by SMEs:
Will CESL reduce the barriers to cross-border trade affecting those
SMEs that are “on the margin” of increasing their cross-border trade?
2.4

Empirical evidence on CESL and the needs of SMEs

This is hard to answer empirically. As others have noted, one of the
weaknesses of the Flash EB surveys is that they asked questions
about contract law in the abstract, including asking for opinions about
the benefits of a hypothetical European contract law without
specifying its contents.27 For this reason, theoretical analysis of its
likely benefits and burdens is important, and many of the papers in
this volume address this need.
It turns out, however, that the Flash EB surveys do provide a few
results with respect to certain major features of CESL. Recall that
CESL is an optional instrument, applicable to cross-border
transactions. The Flash EB surveys specifically asked businesses
about their views of the utility of a common European sales law,
depending on whether it is an optional instrument, and depending on
whether it is applicable only to cross-border transactions. The B2C
survey asked, “If a European contract law was developed, what would
you prefer for your business-to-consumer transactions?” and gave
See Europe in Figures – Eurostat Yearbook 2011, ch. 9 “International
Trade” (European Commission 2011) (citing Eurostat (tet00039)
<http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&plugin=1&languag
e=en&pcode=tet00039>).
27 This criticism was raised by Ackermann, “Das Gemeinsame Europäische
Kaufrecht – eine sinnvolle Option für B2B-Geschäfte?“ in Remien, Herrler
and Limmer (Eds.), Gemeinsames Europäisches Kaufrecht für die EU? (C.H.
Beck 2012), 49, at 53-54.
26
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three options. (The B2B survey asked the corresponding question for
B2B transactions.) The three choices were:
(1) “A common EU contract law replacing 27 national contract
laws.”
(2) “A European contract law that you could choose as an
alternative to the national laws for both your cross-border and
domestic transactions.”
(3) “A European contract law that you could choose as an
alternative to the national laws for your cross-border transactions
only.”
The latter two choices describe an optional instrument, and the third
choice describes an optional instrument for cross-border transactions
only, which is how CESL is structured.28
The surveyed businesses resoundingly reject this third option. In
both the B2B and B2C surveys, only 15.3 percent of the respondents
who expressed a preference selected the third option.29 The
overwhelming preference was for the opposite choice: a single,
mandatory European contract law regime that displaces all 27
national contract laws.30
Even more illuminating are the results when broken down by size
of enterprise. Given the focus of CESL on SMEs, one might hope that
among traders, SMEs are more favorably disposed toward the third
option – but the opposite is true. See Table 5.31

For reasons that will become obvious shortly, it is important to note that
Art. 13(a) of CESL provides for individual Member States to extend its
coverage to domestic transactions. Proposal, 28.
29 Not everyone expressed a preference. In the B2B survey, 12.9 percent of
respondents did not select one of the choices; in the B2C survey, the nonresponse rate was 10.7 percent.
30 This empirical result seems to confirm the theoretical prediction made by
Ganuza and Gomez in this volume: “the rule that limits the choice of the
CESL solely [to] cross-border transaction . . . does not seem a happy one.”
Ganuza and Gomez, “Optional Law for Firms and Consumers: An Economic
Analysis of Opting into the Common European Sales Law,” 8, 14-15.
31 Table 5 presents results for the B2C survey; the B2B results are similar.
28
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TABLE 5: PREFERENCES FOR EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW,
B2C SURVEY, BY ENTERPRISE SIZE ( PERCENT)
Replaces
National
Laws

Optional,
Domestic and
Cross-Border

Optional,
Cross-Border
Only

Micro (1-9)

53.8

32.4

13.8

Small (10-49)

53.3

30.6

16.2

Medium (50-249)

49.3

31.7

18.9

Large (250+)

53.7

25.4

20.9

All Respondents

53.2

31.6

15.3

Note: Percentages may not add to 100 because of rounding. Responses
“Don’t know” or “NA” are excluded. Source: Flash EB 321.

Why the lack of enthusiasm for the third option? The Flash EB
surveys did not ask businesses to explain their answers, but the
patterns in the data we have seen so far suggest the following
explanation:
Most small businesses, and especially micro enterprises, are likely
to transact cross-border business, if at all, in one or two other Member
States.32 Thus, while the need to account for multiple contract law
regimes may be a source of significant transactions costs for SMEs,
the economies of scale associated with moving to a uniform law for
cross-border transactions are small. For many micro enterprises, the
benefit of a uniform European law for cross-border contracts may be
zero, because they are interested in trading with only one additional
Member State – and whether a business has to learn about CESL or
about that Member State’s law, it is one new legal regime either way.
Similarly, an SME that trades with, say, three other Member
States could at best reduce the number of legal systems governing its
contracts by 50 percent, from four to two (CESL plus its domestic
contract law). I say “at best,” because this assumes that the SME
32

See Section 2, supra.
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succeeds at making CESL the governing law in every one of its crossborder contracts. If not, there may be no savings at all.33
On the other hand, a mandatory instrument that applies to all
contracts domestically and cross-border will benefit an SME
interested in trading with even one other Member State. It reduces by
50 percent the number of legal systems that SME must learn (from
two to one). An SME that trades with three other Member States
would be guaranteed a 75 reduction in legal regimes (from four to
one). Thus, one can see why a mandatory regime would be so popular
among SMEs.
There are obvious political and practical reasons why such a
mandatory regime is infeasible. For this reason, it is worth noting that
an optional regime that applies both domestically and cross-border
has the potential, in a best-case scenario, to generate the same
savings.34
These results are summarized in Table 6 for various numbers of
trading partner states and for the three choices of European contract
law offered by the Flash EB survey. Table 6 also helps make sense of
the fact that large businesses seem more tolerant of the possibility of
an optional, cross-border instrument. (Note that the Flash EB surveys
did not limit the optional instrument to transactions involving SMEs,
as CESL does.) It is the largest companies – the companies who are
most likely to do business in many Member States – who stand to gain
the most from an optional cross-border contract law regime, given the
economies of scale associated with the fixed costs of learning a new set
of legal rules. And the differences in savings between a mandatory
European contract law and an optional one are much smaller for a
business trading with 27 countries than a business trading with one.35

It is possible in the B2B context, given that CESL is optional, that some
businesses may experience a rise in the number of contract law systems with
which they must contend, and thus a rise in costs.
34 Again, by best-case scenario, I refer to a situation in which a business is
able to conduct all of its transactions under the optional law.
35 Hence, it is worth noting that Art. 13(b) of CESL provides for individual
Member States to extend its coverage to B2B transactions not involving
SMEs. Proposal, 28.
33
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TABLE 6: REDUCTION IN NUMBER OF LEGAL REGIMES
REQUIRED TO LEARN, BY BREADTH OF CROSS-BORDER TRADE
AND NATURE OF EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW

Number of Other
Member States

Replaces
National
Laws

Optional:
Domestic and
Cross-Border

Optional:
Cross-Border
Only

1

50%

up to 50%

0%

3

75%

up to 75%

up to 50%

10

91%

up to 91%

up to 83%

27

96%

up to 96%

up to 93%

Note: Maximum number of trading partners is 27 when including
Scotland as the 28th legal regime in the EU.

3.

Contract-Law-Related Barriers for Consumers

So far, this paper has focused on the empirical claims related to CESL
from the perspective of businesses, especially SMEs, interested in
cross-border trade. In this section, I turn to the empirical claims
motivating CESL’s provisions governing consumer contracts. I begin
by addressing Claim 3, and in particular the claim that more than half
of all online, cross-border purchase attempts fail.36 I then consider the
evidence on whether contract law creates barriers to cross-border B2C
transactions (Claim 4). Finally, I conclude by considering some
empirical data relevant to one of the salient motivations for CESL’s
consumer-related provisions: the need for greater mandatory
consumer protections.
3.1.

Do sellers reject half of all online, cross-border purchase
attempts?

The Companion Document states: “In practice, attempts to purchase
products online more often fail than succeed in a cross-border context
and often end-up with a disappointing message such as ‘this product is
36

See Companion Document, 3.
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not available for your country of residence.’”37 This claim rests on a
citation to the Scoreboard,38 which in turn cites a 2009
YouGovPsychonomics study commissioned by the EC (“YouGov
Study”),39 which found that 61 percent of attempts at online, crossborder purchases failed, and that 50 out of that 61 percent failed
because the seller refused to sell to the consumer’s country.40
If this statistic is representative of the actual experiences of
consumers, then there is indeed a serious problem with online B2C
contracts in the European Union. And perhaps it is differences in
contract law that lead to half of all online, cross-border purchase
attempts being rejected because the seller refuses to sell to the buyer’s
country. If so, there may be a real need to address B2C contracts at
the European level. Still, this statistic is surprising; is it possible that
in practice more than half of online purchase attempts are rejected by
the seller?
A closer look at the data tells a less dramatic story. First, the
YouGov Study points out that in 52 percent of all attempts at online,
cross-border purchases the seller did not provide for shipping outside
of the seller’s home country.41 Thus, the entire result – that half of all
online, cross-border purchase attempts are rejected because the seller
does not serve the buyer’s country – is explained by the fact that half
of all online retailers do not ship internationally.42
Second, the YouGov Study, by design, did not target online
retailers that purport to serve more than one country; instead the goal
of that study was to target any retailer that had any online presence
at all. In this respect the study was successful: the study identified
nearly 17,000 offers on 100 different consumer products from over
Companion Document, 3.
SEC 385(2010), 9.
39 “Mystery shopping evaluation of cross-border e-commerce in the EU,”
YouGovPsychonomics (2009)), cited in Scoreboard, SEC 385(2010), 27 n. 12.
40 YouGov Study, 24.
41 YouGov Study, 28.
42 This does not mean that contract law is not the problem: it could be that
sellers are reluctant to ship cross-border because of concerns about contract
law. Indeed, in the internet context, one might wonder what difference in
costs to the seller, other than contract law, would deter a seller from trading
cross-border; shipping costs may not differ much and may be borne by the
purchaser anyway. But the fact that half of all sellers do not ship
internationally could simply reflect the fact that many retailers target a more
local audience, and are not interested in competing with larger, more
internationally focused internet retailers. The data do not refute the
hypothesis that contract law is causing the problems identified by the
YouGov Study, but the data do not prove it, either.
37
38
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4,000 online retailers.43 Thus, if consumers randomly selected retailers
with an online presence and attempted to make purchases, they would
fail more than half the time – this is what the YouGov Study
meticulously shows. It is not true, however, that in practice consumers
cannot make purchases half the time. Instead, both the Flash EB 299
data and the Scoreboard data show that no more than 8 percent of
consumers who shop online in a 12 month period are unable to
complete an online, cross-border purchase at least once during that
period.44
3.2.

Do consumers perceive contract-law-related barriers to online
shopping?

The relatively low rate with which consumers experience problems
with online, cross-border shopping suggests that differences in
contract law may not be quite as large a problem as the Companion
Document implies. Indeed, the Scoreboard data suggest that
consumers do not perceive serious problems with contract law when
shopping online. When consumers who make purchases online were
asked why they shopped online, 49 percent said that “certainty about
legal rights” was a “very important” reason, just behind “lower prices”
(50 percent).45 See Table 7. This bears repeating: about half of all
consumers who shop online say they do so because it offers certainty
about legal rights.

YouGov Study, 19. The majority of retailers identified made offers on only
one of the 100 products searched for.
44 According to Flash EB 299a, of EU consumers who had engaged in distance
purchases in the last 12 months, 8 percent encountered at least once a seller
who had refused to sell or deliver to them. Analytical Report, Flash EB 299a,
9. According to Scoreboard, 11 percent of online shoppers reported a problem
when buying or ordering goods, and most of these consumers reported
problems other than a refusal to sell, such as delivery delays or technical
failures with the website. Scoreboard, 24-25.
45 When including both “very important” and “to some extent” responses,
“certainty about legal rights” comes in first among the eight reasons offered.
Scoreboard, 24.
43
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TABLE 7: PERCENT OF ONLINE CONSUMERS DESCRIBING
REASON FOR SHOPPING ONLINE AS “VERY IMPORTANT”

Reason

Very
Important

Lower prices

50

Certainty about legal rights and guarantee

49

Convenience

48

User-friendliness of the website

45

Unavailability of the good in the area or region

45

Wider choice of goods and services

39

Certified quality of the website or availability
of recognized trust mark

35

Ratings and feedbacks on the website from
other users

31

Note: Percentages may not add to 100 because of rounding.
Source: Scoreboard, 24.

On the other hand, when consumers who had not shopped online
were asked why they did not, the most common reasons given were
“Prefer to shop in person” (20 percent) and “Have no need” (17
percent). The top-ranking reason that seems related to contract law,
“trust concerns/receiving or returning goods, complaints or redress” (9
percent) came in a distant fifth place.46
One limitation of this data is that these questions do not
distinguish between domestic and cross-border online purchases. This
is a weakness of the cited Flash EB surveys as well. In general, they
do not ask companies or consumers to compare their experiences in
domestic trade with their experiences in cross-border trade. As a
46

Scoreboard, 25.
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consequence, it is hard to tell whether these statistics apply equally to
domestic and cross-border online shopping.
Fortunately, there was at least one question in the Flash EB 299
survey that made such a direct comparison. In this question
consumers who had made at least one distance purchase – i.e., by
internet, post, or phone – in the last 12 months whether they had
experienced any problems with the delivery of the goods they had
ordered. As Table 8 shows, consumers reported no more delivery
problems with cross-border purchases from other Member States than
from their home countries. (Indeed they reported slightly fewer.) This
result suggests that cross-border transactions may involve fewer
problems than we might otherwise assume.
TABLE 8: PERCENT OF CONSUMERS WHO EXPERIENCED DELAY OR NONDELIVERY OF DISTANCE PURCHASES, BY SELLER LOCATION
Delay in
Delivery

No Delivery
at All

Consumer’s Own Country

18

6

Another Member State

16

5

Non-EU Country

19

6

Source: Summary, Flash EB 299, 20.

3.3.

Is there a need for higher, uniform consumer protection?

One theme that runs throughout the European Commission’s
activities in the area of contract law is a strong commitment to
consumer protection, often through the use of mandatory rules. CESL
is no exception. It provides “a single set of mandatory rules which offer
a high level of consumer protection.”47
To the extent that this replicates the degree of consumer
protection already present in the law of most EU nations, this
approach seems to jibe with the attitudes of most European
consumers. The recent Flash EB survey of consumers indicates that
47

Proposal, 4.
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consumers are largely satisfied with existing consumer protections.
See Table 9. By a 2-to-1 margin, consumers agreed with the statement
that sellers in their countries respected their rights.48 (The survey did
not ask about sellers in other Member States.)
TABLE 9: CONSUMER ATTITUDES TOWARD EXISTING CONSUMER
PROTECTIONS
Agree/Tend
to Agree

Disagree/Tend
to Disagree

You are adequately protected
by existing measures to protect
consumers

57

35

In general, sellers in your country
respect your rights as a consumer

65

28

Note: Percentages responding “Don’t Know/NA” are omitted.
Source: Summary, Flash EB 299, 23.

To the extent that CESL serves to increase, rather than preserve,
the level of mandatory consumer protection, its merits are less clear.
Because CESL is an optional instrument, it may offer advantages for
those consumers who desire greater protections than currently
available to them. On the other hand, mandatory consumer
protections do not come for free. They raise the costs of sellers, and
therefore raise the prices that all consumers must pay. Further, BarGill and Ben-Shahar argue that mandatory consumer protections will
subsidize sophisticated consumers, who know to invoke them, at the
expense of the “poor, the elderly, the less educated.”49
Here, the Flash EB surveys make a final contribution. The
consumer attitudes survey examined which consumers were the most
likely to identify a problem with their purchase and complain to the
seller about it. And it finds that, as Bar-Gill and Ben-Shahar predict,
Interestingly, trust in sellers to respect consumer’s rights was higher than
trust in public authorities to protect the consumer’s rights. Summary, Flash
EB 299, 23.
49 Bar-Gill and Ben-Shahar, “Regulatory Techniques in Consumer Protection:
A Critique of the Common European Sales Law,” 9.
48
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the elderly and least educated are far less likely to invoke their rights
by complaining to a seller than the younger and more educated. See
Figure 2. The concern that the most vulnerable groups will be crosssubsidizing the most advantaged may not be speculative.
FIGURE 2: PERCENTAGE OF CONSUMERS IDENTIFYING A PROBLEM AND
COMPLAINING TO THE SELLER, BY EDUCATION AND AGE

20
16
12
8
4
0

Least Educated

Age 55+

Most Educated

Age 25–39

Note: “Least Educated” left school before age 16; “Most educated”
continued school past age 20. Source: Analytical Report, Flash EB
299, 132.

4.

Conclusion

The Proposal and its Companion Document cite a number of
surveys in support of their central empirical claims: that there are
SMEs and consumers who want engage in cross-border transactions or
increase their cross-border activity, but do not, and that obstacles
created by differences in contract law are impediments to cross-border
trade, especially for SMEs and consumers. A closer look at these
surveys, especially the Flash Eurobarometer surveys on which the
Proposal primary relies, reveals that the cited data only ambiguously
supports these empirical claims. The cited surveys tend to cast doubt
that the numbers of discouraged traders are large, and the surveys
make a weak case that contract law is the primary obstacle to cross-
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border trade. Nonetheless, it is plausible that contract law plays a role
in discouraging a small but economically significant number of traders
and consumers from cross-border trade.
Given the controversy surrounding CESL and the numerous
concerns about the precise ways in which it implements its vision of a
uniform European sales law, it is worth further study to determine
whether the empirical claims justifying this project can be validated.
Studies other than the surveys cited by the Proposal may help to
support or refute the empirical claims in the Proposal. A better sense
of the empirical foundations of the Proposal will inform the normative
and policy-based arguments—many of which are articulated by other
papers in this volume—that will ultimately determine the fate of
CESL.

Readers with comments should address them to:
Professor William H. J. Hubbard
University of Chicago Law School
1111 East 60th Street
Chicago, IL 60637
whubbar@uchicago.edu
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